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Abstract 
In many empirical problems, the evaluation of treatment effects is complicated by sample 
selection such that the outcome is only observed for a non-random subpopulation. In the 
absence of instruments and/or tight parametric assumptions, treatment effects are not point 
identified, but can be bounded under mild restrictions.  Previous work on partial 
identification has primarily focused on the "always selected" (whose outcomes are observed 
irrespective of the treatment).  This paper complements those studies by considering further 
populations, namely the "compliers" (whose selection states react to the treatment) and the 
selected population. We derive sharp bounds under various assumptions (monotonicity and 
stochastic dominance) and provide an empirical application to a school voucher experiment. 
Keywords 
Causal inference, principal stratification, nonparametric bounds, sample selection. 
JEL Classification 
C14, C21, C24. 1 Introduction
The sample selection problem, see for instance Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974), arises when
the outcome of interest is only observed for a non-randomly selected subpopulation. This may aw
causal analysis and is an ubiquitous phenomenon in many elds where treatment eect evaluations
are conducted, such as labor, health, and educational economics. E.g., in the estimation of the
returns to a training it is an issue when only a selective subgroup of training participants and
non-participants nds employment which is a condition for observing earnings. Similar problems
are inherent in clinical trials when some of the participants in medical treatments pass away
(\truncation by death") before the health outcome is measured. As a further example, consider
the eect of randomly provided private schooling on college entrance examinations. The sample
selection problem arises if only a non-random subgroup of students takes the exam.
Principal stratication, see Frangakis and Rubin (2002), provides a natural framework for
characterizing sample selection problems, as it allows dening populations (i.e., principal strata)
in terms of their behavior w.r.t. selection under dierent treatment states. This is useful because
the selection problem does not arise within a particular stratum consisting of individuals with
the same selection behavior, i.e., being of the same \type". Thus, treatment eects are identied
if the imposed assumptions and the data imply that a principal stratum is observed both under
treatment and non-treatment. Therefore, the principal stratication framework enables us to
explicitly state under which assumptions identication works for particular latent populations.
In the sample selection literature in economics going back to Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979),
identication often relies on tight parametric restrictions, such as distributional assumptions and
eect homogeneity across dierent populations. Albeit the literature has moved towards more
exible models, see for instance Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) and Newey (2009), it typically
imposes strong assumptions on the unobserved terms likely to be violated in many applications,
as conrmed by the specication test proposed in Huber and Melly (2011). In the absence of
unattractive parametric restrictions and/or instruments for sample selection, treatment eects
1are not point identied, but upper and lower bounds can still be obtained under fairly mild
restrictions. This is the approach pursued in this paper.
Partial identication of economic parameters in general goes back to Manski (1989, 1994)
and Robins (1989). In the context of the sample selection problem, several contributions in the
elds of principal stratication and econometrics derive bounds on treatment eects. Zhang and
Rubin (2003) (see also Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli, 2008) bound the average treatment eects in
one particular stratum, namely the \always selected" population, whose outcomes are observed
both under treatment and non-treatment. To this end, the authors explore the identifying power
of two assumptions both separately and jointly: (i) monotonicity of selection in the treatment
and (ii) stochastic dominance of the potential outcomes of the always selected over those of
other populations. Imai (2008) shows that the bounds of Zhang and Rubin (2003) are sharp and
additionally considers the identication of quantile treatment eects. Also Lee (2009) focuses on
the always selected in the evaluation of the average wage eects of the Job Corps, the largest job
training program for disadvantaged youths in the USA. As Zhang and Rubin (2003), he imposes
monotonicity of selection (but not stochastic dominance) and proves sharpness of the bounds.
Blanco, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes (2011) assess the same program, but add assumptions on
the order of mean potential outcomes within and across subpopulations to obtain tighter bounds.
Still for the always selected, Grilli and Mealli (2008) impose the stochastic dominance assumption
along with a restriction on the relative size of the principal strata to bound the relative eects of
two university degree programs on employment.
The main reason why the literature mainly concentrates on the always selected appears to be
that it is the only principal stratum for which outcomes can be observed both under treatment and
non-treatment, see the discussion in Zhang and Rubin (2003), Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli (2008),
and Lee (2009). However, as argued by the latter, it depends on the context of the treatment
whether this is a population of policy interest. In contrast to the aforementioned contributions,
Lechner and Melly (2007) bound the eects on those treated and selected. When evaluating the
wage eects of a job training program, this group corresponds to the training participants with
2employment and is directly observed in the data. Note that this is a mixed population consisting
of always selected and those who work under treatment, but would not work without treatment,
i.e., the \compliers" in selection w.r.t. treatment. Lechner and Melly (2007) argue that it is more
intuitive to bound the eects for this observed group rather than a latent principal stratum.
Furthermore, they claim that in the context of training programs, the treated and selected are
the most interesting population because it is them who benet from the potential wage eects of
the training.
In the light of the previous discussion, we argue that it is, depending on the evaluation
problem at hand, useful to look at further target populations in addition to the ones covered
in the literature so far. E.g., it is the compliers whose selection state reacts on the treatment
and it appears interesting in many application whether this is observed along with (and may be
rooted in) a particular treatment eect. Taking the wage eects of a job training program as
an example, one might want to learn whether the change in the employment state due to the
training is accompanied by an increase in the potential wage. If yes, this points to an increase
in productivity that may be at least partly responsible for nding employment. Furthermore,
in particular applications, the compliers might also bear more policy relevance than the always
selected. E.g., consider a school voucher experiment investigating the eect of private schooling
on test scores in a college entrance exam which are only observed conditional on taking the exam.
As the compliers do so only under private schooling, they are likely to come from educationally
more disadvantaged families than the always selected. This might exactly be the group policy
makers want to target.
Furthermore, we might prefer to make causal statements rather for larger shares of the en-
tire population than for smaller groups. The largest possible group for which at least one poten-
tial outcome (under treatment or non-treatment) is observed constitutes the selected population,
which is again a mixture of several principal strata. Indeed, policy makers might want to learn
about the average eects on all individuals whose outcomes are observed, without thinking in
terms of dierent principal strata. Also Newey (2007) considers this population, however, inves-
3tigating point identication based on continuous instruments. Finally, there is also a statistical
argument to look at populations other than the always selected. In fact, if neither monotonicity
nor unattractive parametric assumptions are imposed and if the share of \never selected" (whose
outcomes are not observed irrespective of the treatment state) is larger than the one of the al-
ways selected, no informative bounds can be obtained for the latter. However, informative (albeit
generally quite large) bounds are still available for the selected population.
The main contribution of this paper is the derivation of sharp bounds on average treatment
eects among compliers, \deers" (outcomes observed if not treated and not observed if treated),
and the selected population, which have not been considered in previous work. We show that
under the monotonicity and/or stochastic dominance assumptions, informative bounds can be
derived even when the outcomes of particular strata are only observed in one treatment arm.
For instance, one useful result is that under both assumptions, the lower bound on the selected
population coincides with that on the always selected. This is relevant for many applications where
particular interest lies in whether the lower bound includes a zero eect. Thus, the assumptions
may bear considerable identifying power, which is demonstrated in an application to a school
voucher experiment in Colombia previously analyzed by Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally characterizes the sam-
ple selection problem based on principal stratication. Section 3 discusses partial identication of
treatment eects for the compliers and the selected population under no assumptions (worst case
bounds) as well as under monotonicity and/or stochastic dominance. Estimators are presented
in Section 4. An empirical application to a school voucher experiment in Colombia is provided
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The selection problem
As in the standard treatment evaluation framework, assume that we are interested in the eect of
a binary treatment, T 2 f1;0g, on an outcome Y , at a specic time after assignment. Using the
4potential outcome framework, see for instance Neyman (1923), Fisher (1935), and Rubin (1977),
we will denote by Yi(1) and Yi(0) the two potential outcomes that individual i would receive
under treatment and non-treatment. Even under randomization of the treatment, post-treatment
complications might introduce selection bias and aw causal inference. One particular form of
such complications is sample selection, implying that the outcome of interest is only observed
for a non-random subpopulation. To address this problem let S 2 f1;0g be an observed binary
post-treatment selection indicator which is 1 if the outcome of some individual is observed and 0
otherwise. Furthermore, we denote by Si(1) and Si(0) the two potential selection states. Then,
we can express the selection indicator and the observed outcome as functions of the respective
potential states:
S = T  S(1) + (1   T)  S(0);
Y = T  Y (1) + (1   T)  Y (0) if S = 1 and not observed otherwise.
I.e., at best (if S = 1) one of the two potential outcomes is observed. As at least one
potential outcome remains unknown, both point and partial identication of treatment eects
require further assumptions. The rst restriction maintained throughout the discussion is the
so-called Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA, e.g., Rubin, 1990), which rules out
interference between units and general equilibrium eects of the treatment:
Assumption 1:
Yi(t)?Tj 8j 6= i;
Si(t)?Tj 8j 6= i:
\?" denotes independence. This standard assumption implies that the potential post-treatment
variables of any subject i are unrelated to the treatment status of any other individual.
Causal inference requires the specication of the treatment assignment mechanism. If ran-
domly assigned, the treatment is independent of the potential values of the post-treatment vari-
5ables S;Y . However, in many observational studies randomization is assumed to hold only condi-
tional on some observed pre-treatment covariates X. This assumption is known in the literature
as conditional independence assumption (CIA), also referred to as \selection on observables" or
\unconfoundedness", see for instance Imbens (2004) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). It im-
plies that the potential outcomes and selection states are independent of the treatment assign-
ment conditional on the pre-treatment variables.
In the sample selection framework, Lee (2009), Mealli and Pacini (2008a) and Mealli and
Pacini (2008b), among others, assume that the joint distribution of the potential post-treatment
variables is independent of the treatment given X. Imposing joint independence is stronger





(Y (1);Y (0))?Tj(S(1);S(0));X = x 8x 2 X (unconfoundness);
where X denotes the support of X. In the further discussion, conditioning on X will be kept
implicit, such that all results either refer to the experimental framework, see also the application
further below, or to an analysis within cells with the same values of X.
As shown in Table 1 and discussed in Zhang and Rubin (2003), the population can be divided
into four principal strata (denoted as G), according to the value the selection indicator S(t)
takes under dierent treatment states. The terms \always selected", \compliers", \deers", and
\never selected" are in the spirit of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin
(1996). They, however, use equivalent expressions for a dierent problem, namely to characterize
non-compliance w.r.t. instruments in the presence of endogeneity.
By Assumption 2, the stratum G some individual belongs to is independent of the treatment
1Assumption 2 can be replaced by T?(S(1);S(0))jX = x and Y (0)?Tj(S(1);S(0));X = x; 8x 2 X, if the
inference is conditional on T = 1, i.e., if one is only interested in treatment eects on the treated.
6Table 1: Principal strata
Principal strata (G) S(1) S(0) appellation
11 1 1 Always selected
10 1 0 Compliers
01 0 1 Deers
00 0 0 Never selected
assignment and the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment conditional on the
principal stratum. Therefore, any treatment eect dened within a principal stratum is a well
dened causal parameter. The problem for identication is that either S(1) or S(0) but never
both are known for any individual such that the principal stratum to which a subject belongs is
not directly observed. Without further assumptions neither the principal strata proportions nor
the distributions of the potential outcomes within each stratum are identied. To see this, note
that the observed values of T and S generate the following four observed subgroups, denoted as
o(T;S), which are all mixtures of two principal strata.
Table 2: Observed subgroups and principal strata
Observed subgroups o(T;S) principal strata Y observed
o(1;1) = fi : Ti = 1;Si = 1g subject i belongs either to 11 or to 10 yes
o(1;0) = fi : Ti = 1;Si = 0g subject i belongs either to 01 or to 00 no
o(0;1) = fi : Ti = 0;Si = 1g subject i belongs either to 11 or to 01 yes
o(0;0) = fi : Ti = 0;Si = 0g subject i belongs either to 10 or to 00 no
Therefore, also the probability to belong to an observed subgroup is a mixture of principal
strata proportions, henceforth denoted as ss0  Pr(S(1) = s;S(0) = s0). Let Psjt represent
the observed selection probability conditional on treatment, Pr(S = sjT = t), in the population
of interest. Under Assumption 2, which ensures that the strata proportions conditional on the
treatment are equal to the unconditional strata proportions, the relation between the observed
Psjt and the latent ss0 is as follows:
Thus, point identication of causal eects can only be obtained by imposing unattractive
parametric assumptions, see for instance the discussion in Mealli and Pacini (2008b), Zhang,
Rubin, and Mealli (2009), and Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979). However, intervals of treatment
eects for particular strata that are consistent with the observed data can be derived under
7Table 3: Observed probabilities and principal strata proportions
Observed cond. selection prob. princ. strata proportions
P1j1  Pr(S = 1jT = 1) 11 + 10
P0j1  Pr(S = 0jT = 1) 01 + 00
P1j0  Pr(S = 1jT = 0) 11 + 01
P0j0  Pr(S = 0jT = 0) 10 + 00
milder assumptions. As mentioned before, treated and non-treated units are only observed for
the always selected (stratum 11), i.e. those selected irrespective of the treatment state. For this
reason, most of the literature on bounding treatment eects under sample selection focuses on
stratum 11, see Zhang and Rubin (2003), Grilli and Mealli (2008), Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli
(2008), and Lee (2009), with the exception of Lechner and Melly (2007).
We, however, argue that the always selected are generally not the only population of interest
and show that informative bounds can also be derived for other populations under assumptions
which seem plausible in many applications. In particular, we are interested in the eects in
stratum 10 and in the entire selected population (S = 1). Stratum 10 consists of those individuals
selected with and not selected without treatment. Thus, they can be referred to as \compliers" in
selection w.r.t. the treatment. This stratum is interesting in many applications as it encounters
the marginal population that changes the selection state due to the treatment. Taking the wage
eects of a job training program as an example, we might be interested in whether the change in
the employment state due to the training is accompanied by an increase in the potential outcomes.
If yes, this points to an increase in productivity that may be at least partly responsible for nding
employment. Furthermore, consider a school voucher experiment investing the eect of private
schooling on college entrance examinations. As the compliers take the test only under private
schooling, they are likely to be more disadvantaged and academically less challenged at home
than the always selected. This may be exactly the population policy makers want to target.
The selected population is a mixture of always selected, compliers, and deers (stratum 01:
selected under non-treatment, not selected under treatment) and therefore encounters individuals
with dierent \selection behaviors". Still, policy makers might want to learn about the eects on
8all individuals whose outcomes are observed irrespective of their stratum aliations. Also Newey
(2007) considers the average eect on the selected population, however, based on a continuous in-
strument for selection allowing for point identication. After all, the selected population contains
all subjects for which at least one outcome (under treatment and/or non-treatment) is observed
such that reasonable bounds on the eects may still be attained under the assumptions discussed
below. In contrast, for the never selected bounds are most likely very uninformative. Thus, the
selected group appears to be the largest possible subpopulation for which useful inference appears
to be feasible.
To better understand how principal stratication is related to the econometric literature on
sample selection, we conclude this section by formulating the identication problem in terms of a
structural model (see also Huber, 2010, Mealli and Pacini, 2008a, and Mellace and Rocci, 2010):
Y = '(T;U);
S = If&(T;V )  0g;
T = If ()  0g; (1)
where Ifg is the indicator function, ';&;  are unknown functions, and U;V; are unobserved
terms. ?U;V by random assignment (or conditional on X by the conditional independence
assumption in observational studies). The selectivity of S depends on the relationship of the
unobserved terms U and V . Note that the sample selection problem disappears when conditioning
on V because then, S and U are conditionally independent. Even though V is unknown, the
problem can be controlled for if there exists a function G(V ) such that
U?SjG(V ):
Imbens (2006) calls such a function \type of unit". Principal stratication is a natural choice of
9G(), as
G(v) = G(v0) if &(t;v) = &(t;v0) 8 t, v 6= v0 ,
G(v) 6= G(v0) if &(t;v) 6= &(t;v0) for some t, v 6= v0 ,
and U?SjG(V ) by construction. Once we condition on the \type of unit", selection becomes
ignorable. Principal stratication represents the coarsest possible choice of the type function. As
pointed out by Imbens (2006), the optimal type function is any functional that is constant on
sets of values of V which, for all values t, lead to the same value of S.
3 Assumptions and partial identication
The identication strategies discussed below are based on the fact that the expected values of the
observed outcomes in a particular treatment state come from a mixture of two latent strata:
E(Y jT = 0;S = 1) =
11
11 + 01
 E(Y jT = 0;G = 11) +
01
11 + 01
 E(Y jT = 0;G = 01)
and
E(Y jT = 1;S = 1) =
11
11 + 10
 E(Y jT = 1;G = 11) +
10
11 + 10
 E(Y jT = 1;G = 10):
Horowitz and Manski (1995) have shown that whenever it is possible to bound the mixing prob-




11+10, respectively, sharp bounds can be ob-
tained for any parameter of the mixture components that respects stochastic dominance. We will
use this fact to derive bounds for the average treatment eect (ATE) on various populations. A
similar argument can be used to bound any parameter that respects stochastic dominance as, for
instance, the quantile treatment eect (QTE).
103.1 Worst case bounds
Assume that the support of the potential outcomes is bounded, i.e., Y (1);Y (0) 2 [Y LB;Y UB],
where Y LB;Y UB are the values at the lower and upper end of the support, respectively.This
condition rules out innite upper or lower bounds on the ATE in any population even without
imposing restrictions other than Assumptions 1 and 2. In the absence of further assumptions
Zhang and Rubin (2003) derive the worst case bounds of the ATE on the always selected (stratum
11), henceforth denoted as 11, which are shown to be sharp in Imai (2008). In order to obtain
their results, note that Table 3 provides us with the following equations:
P1j0   01 = 11 ) 01  P1j0;
P0j1   01 = 00 ) 01  P0j1;
P1j1   P1j0 + 01 = 10 ) 01  P1j0   P1j1;
such that
01 2 [max(0;P1j0   P1j1);min(P1j0;P0j1)]: (2)
For the sake of brevity, let  Yt;s  E(Y jT = t;S = s), i.e., the mean of Y given T = t and
S = s (which is only observed for S = 1). Furthermore, let FYt;s(y)  Pr(Y  yjT = t;S = s)
and F 1
Yt;s(q)  inffy : FYt;s(y)  qg, i.e., the conditional cdf and quantile function of Y given
T = t and S = s. Finally, let  Yt;s(minjq)  E(Y jT = t;S = s;y  F 1
Yt;s(q)) and  Yt;s(maxjq) 
E(Y jT = t;S = s;y  F 1
Yt;s(1   q)). The upper and the lower bound of the ATE on the always
selected, denoted as UB
11 and LB








[ Y1;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)    Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0)]: (3)
Thus, the authors suggest to optimize over all possible values of the deers' share 01 that are
11consistent with the data to obtain the upper and lower bound. A rst contribution of the present
work is to show that numerical optimization is not necessary. As outlined in the appendix, UB
11
and LB
11 can be simplied to
UB
11 =  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j1)    Y0;1(minj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j0);
LB
11 =  Y1;1(minj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j1)    Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j0); (4)
where max
01  min(P1j0;P0j1). The intuition of this result is that since we are able to bound
any strata proportion, we can apply the ndings in Horowitz and Manski (1995) to bound the
mean of the always selected under treatment and non-treatment. The reason why one does not
require numerical optimization is that the upper and lower bounds are maximized and minimized,
respectively, when 01 = max
01 , see the appendix. Note that the bounds are only informative (i.e.,
tighter than Y UB   Y LB) if P1j0 > P0j1, which has also been noticed by Lee (2009). This
implies that 11 > 00, i.e., that the share of always selected is larger than the share of never
selected. If this is the case (and only then the bounds for the always selected are meaningful),
then (P1j0 max
01 )=P1j1 = (P1j0 P0j1)=P1j1 and (P1j0 max
01 )=P1j0 = (P1j0 P0j1)=P1j0, such that
the bound only depends on this ratio of observed proportions. Equivalent bounds can be derived
keeping any other stratum proportion xed, e.g. 11, instead of 01.
In contrast to previous work we will now also derive bounds for the compliers (stratum 10),
the deers (stratum 01), and the selected population. It is obvious from our previous discussion
that the share of compliers in o(1;1) is 10=(11 + 10) = (P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1, i.e., the
fraction of those who are not always selected. This allows us to bound the upper and lower
values of the mean potential outcome under treatment by  Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0 + min
01 )=P1j1)
and  Y1;1(minj(P1j1  P1j0 +min
01 )=P1j1), respectively, where min
01  max(0;P1j0  P1j1). However,
nothing can be said about the mean potential outcome under non-treatment, as there are no
compliers in o(0;1). This requires us to assume the theoretical upper and lower bounds of the





10 =  Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0 + min
01 )=P1j1)   Y LB;
LB
10 =  Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0 + min
01 )=P1j1)   Y UB: (5)
These bounds are informative only if P1j0 P1j1 < 0 ) 10 > 01, i.e., if there are more compliers
than deers. In this case, (P1j1   P1j0 + min
01 )=P1j1 = (P1j1   P1j0)=P1j1. The proofs for the
sharpness of these and all other bounds proposed below are provided in the appendix.
Similarly, the share of deers in o(0;1) is 01=(11 + 01) = 01=P1j0. This allows us to
bound the upper and lower value of the mean potential outcome under non-treatment by
 Y0;1(maxjmin
01 =P1j0) and  Y0;1(minjmin
01 =P1j0), respectively. Since there are no deers in o(1;1),
we again need to invoke Y UB and Y LB. The sharp upper and lower bounds for the ATE on the




01 = Y UB    Y0;1(minjmin
01 =P1j0);
LB
01 = Y LB    Y0;1(maxjmin
01 =P1j0): (6)
These bounds are only informative if P1j0   P1j1 > 0 ) 01 > 10, i.e., if the deers' share is
at least as large as the compliers' share. If this is true, then min
01 =P1j1 = (P1j0   P1j1)=P1j1.
This is, together with the identication result for the compliers, an interesting nding because
it implies that without imposing monotonicity of selection in the treatment (as outlined below),
bounds are informative either for the deers or for the compliers, but never for both populations.
It also implies that unless P1j1   P1j0 = 0, either positive (if P1j1   P1j0 > 0) or negative (if
P1j0   P1j1 > 0) monotonicity of S in T is consistent with the data, but not both at the same
time. See the discussion in the next subsection.
Finally, we derive the worst case bounds for the selected population, which is a mixed popu-
13lation of always selected, compliers, and deers. Their respective shares are given by
2  11
211 + 10 + 01
=




211 + 10 + 01
=









Note that assuming the upper bound of the mean potential outcome under treatment for the
always selected,  Y1;1(maxjP1j0=P1j1) implies assuming the lower bound of the mean potential
outcome under treatment for the compliers,  Y1;1(minj1 P1j0=P1j1), and vice versa, as the weighted
average of both must always yield  Y1;1. For the same reason, assuming the upper bound of the
mean potential outcome under non-treatment for the always selected is equivalent to assuming the
lower bound of the mean potential outcome under non-treatment for the deers. In Appendix
A.1.4 we use this fact to obtain unambiguous expressions for the bounds on the ATE on the
selected population (S=1) for some xed deers' share 01. Furthermore, the appendix also
shows that we need not optimize over the range of all the possible values of the deers' share. In
fact, setting 01 = max
01 leads to sharp bounds on S=1. Then, the upper bound is
UB
S=1 =
2  (P1j0   max
01 )
P1j1 + P1j0
 ( Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j1)    Y0;1(minj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j0))
+
P1j1   P1j0 + max
01
P1j1 + P1j0
 ( Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0 + max





 (Y UB    Y0;1(maxjmax
01 =P1j0))






 ( Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   max











P1j1   P1j0 + max
01
P1j1 + P1j0
 Y LB  
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y0;1: (7)
14The lower bound is given by
LB
S=1 =
2  (P1j0   max
01 )
P1j1 + P1j0
 ( Y1;1(minj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j1)    Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j0))
+
P1j1   P1j0 + max
01
P1j1 + P1j0
 ( Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0 + max





 (Y LB    Y0;1(minjmax
01 =P1j0))






 ( Y1;1(minj(P1j0   max











P1j1   P1j0 + max
01
P1j1 + P1j0
 Y UB  
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y0;1: (8)
Note that the identication region shrinks as the shares of compliers and/or deers decreases.
In the special case that both shares are zero the ATE on the selected population is point identied.
If the share of only one population is equal to zero the bounds are equivalent to those under
monotonicity which we will derive in the next subsection. Another result worth noting is that






  Y1;1 +
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
 Y UB  
P1j1
P1j1 + P1j0







 ( Y1;1   Y LB) +
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0






  Y1;1 +
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
 Y LB  
P1j1
P1j1 + P1j0







 ( Y1;1   Y UB) +
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
 (Y LB    Y0;1);
15which happen to be equal to the bounds under 11 = 0, i.e., in the absence of always selected.
Thus, even though informative bounds cannot be derived for the always selected if P1j0 < P0j1,
they can still be derived for the selected population.
3.2 Monotonicity
A commonly imposed assumption in the literature on partial identication of treatment eects
under sample selection is weak monotonicity of selection w.r.t. the treatment:
Assumption 3:
Pr(S(1)  S(0)) = 1 (monotonicity of selection):
In terms of the structural model in (1) this can be stated as
Assumption 3SM:
Pr(&(1;v)  &(0;v)) = 1 8v in the support of V .
The monotonicity assumption requires that the potential selection state never decreases in
the treatment and, thus, rules out the existence of the deers (stratum 01). A symmetric result
is obtained by assuming Pr(S(0)  S(1)) = 1 which implies that stratum 10 does not exist.
As already mentioned before, assuming Pr(S(1)  S(0)) = 1 (positive monotonicity) is only
consistent with the data if P1j1   P1j0  0 and Pr(S(0)  S(1)) = 1 (negative monotonicity) if
P1j0 P1j1  0. These are necessary, albeit not sucient conditions for the respective monotonicity
assumption. For the sake of brevity and due to the symmetry of the argumentation, we will only
focus on Assumption 3 (positive monotonicity) in the subsequent discussion.
The plausibility of monotonicity depends on the empirical context. E.g., it is not necessarily
satised in the evaluation of the returns to a job training. In fact, employment (S) might
react negatively on the training (T) due to reduced job search eort while being trained, a
phenomenon known as \lock-in" eect. Monotonicity might therefore only be plausible in later
16periods after the accomplishment of the training. The assumption seems more innocuous when
evaluating the eectiveness of private schooling on college entrance examinations, given that
private schooling oers a better education than public alternatives and aects the preferences for
academic achievement. It appears reasonable to assume that students are more likely to take the
test when receiving better education or motivation to pursue an academic career such that deers
can be ruled out.
Monotonicity has been considered in Lee (2009), Zhang and Rubin (2003), and Zhang, Rubin,
and Mealli (2008) to bound the ATE on the always selected (stratum 11) and in Lechner and
Melly (2007) to derive bounds for the treated and selected population. Lee (2009) shows that the
following bounds are sharp for the ATE on the always selected:
UB
11 =  Y1;1(maxjP1j0=P1j1)    Y0;1;
LB
11 =  Y1;1(minjP1j0=P1j1)    Y0;1: (9)
The intuition of this result is that under monotonicity, o(0;1) consists only of individuals belonging
to stratum 11 such that  Y0;1 is the mean potential outcome of the always selected under non-
treatment. Furthermore, P1j0 = 11. Therefore, the share of the always selected in o(1;1) is
11=(11 +10) = P1j0=P1j1. In the most extreme cases, either the upper or lower P1j0=P1j1 share
of the outcome distribution in o(1;1) represents the potential outcomes of the always selected
under treatment, which gives rise to the upper and lower bounds on 11 that are tighter than
the worst case bounds. Two points are worth noting. First, we have seen in the last section
that if 00 > 11, informative bounds are only obtained for the selected population and either
the compliers or the deers, without further assumptions. By introducing monotonicity we also
identify meaningful bounds for the always selected, which turn out to be more informative than
under the stochastic dominance assumption discussed further below. Second, if P1j0   P1j1 > 0,
the bounds are not informative, because 01 cannot be zero. As discussed before, the data can
provide evidence against (positive or negative) monotonicity.
17We now derive the bounds on the ATE on the compliers, 10, which are just special cases of
the worst case bounds given that 01 = 0. Therefore, they are sharp given the sharpness of the
worst case bounds. Thus, under monotonicity it immediately follows that 10 is bounded by
UB
10 =  Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0)=P1j1)   Y LB;
LB
10 =  Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0)=P1j1)   Y UB: (10)
It is obvious that monotonicity does not shrink the bounds for the compliers, as the worst case
bounds under non-treatment are unaected by ruling out deers. However, the assumption
assures that the bounds are informative. Indeed, in the worst case scenario the bounds were only
informative if P1j0   P1j1 < 0 which implies that the lower bound on the deers' share is zero
(min
01 = 0), see (2).
Assumption 3 has identifying power for the selected population, which is now only a mixture
of always selected and compliers. The respective proportions of these groups are
2  11






























  Y1;1  
P1j1   P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0




















  Y1;1  
P1j1   P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
 Y UB: (12)
The identication region shrinks as the complier population decreases and S=1 is point identied
in the absence of compliers such that P1j1  P1j0 = 0. Then, the selected population consists only
of always selected individuals.
3.3 Stochastic dominance
Assumption 4 formalizes stochastic dominance which has been considered by Zhang and Rubin
(2003), Grilli and Mealli (2008), Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli (2008), and Lechner and Melly
(2007), see also Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) for a related, but somewhat
dierent form of dominance.
Assumption 4:
Pr(Y (t)  yjG = 11)  Pr(Y (t)  yjG = 10); t 2 f0;1g;
and
Pr(Y (t)  yjG = 11)  Pr(Y (t)  yjG = 01); t 2 f0;1g (stochastic dominance):
I.e., the potential outcome among the always selected at any rank of the outcome distribu-
tion and in any treatment state is at least as high as that of the compliers or the deers, re-
spectively.2 Taking the evaluation of the returns to a job training as example, it implies that
the always selected have potential wages that are at least as high as the ones of other groups.
2For our purpose, which is the derivation of bounds on the ATE, the weaker mean dominance assumption, i.e.
E[Y (t)jG = 11]  E[Y (t)jG = 10] and E[Y (t)jG = 11]  E[Y (t)jG = 01]; t 2 f0;1g, is sucient. However,
stochastic dominance is required when considering other parameters as for instance the quantile treatment eect
(QTE).
19To justify Assumption 4, note that the always selected are employed irrespective of the training.
Therefore, they are likely to be more motivated and/or able than other populations. Zhang, Ru-
bin, and Mealli (2008) argue that ability tends to be positively correlated with wages and thus,
the stochastic dominance assumption (or \positive selection") appears to be plausible. Similar
arguments hold for the evaluation of private schooling with regard to the performance in col-
lege entrance examinations. As the always selected are those taking the exam with and without
private schooling, it seems reasonable to assume that their potential test scores are higher than
those of other groups.
Under Assumption 4, Imai (2008) shows that the following bounds proposed by Zhang and
Rubin (2003) are sharp for the ATE on the always selected:
UB
11 =  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j1)    Y0;1;
LB
11 =  Y1;1    Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j0): (13)
As E[Y (t)jG = 11]  E[Y (t)jG = 10], E[Y (t)jG = 11]  E[Y (t)jG = 01] for t 2 f0;1g, the means
 Y1;1,  Y0;1 constitute the lower bounds of E[Y (1)jG = 11] and E[Y (0)jG = 11], respectively. Thus,
Assumption 4 is likely to shrink the worst case bounds because  Y0;1   Y0;1(minj(P1j0 max
01 )=P1j0)
and  Y1;1   Y1;1(minj(P1j0 max
01 )=P1j1). Note that width of the bounds is maximized if the share
of the always selected is smaller than the one of the never selected. Then,  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0  
max
01 )=P1j1) =  Y1;1(maxj0) and  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j0) =  Y0;1(maxj0) such that they are
uninformative which requires us to use the theoretical upper bound Y UB.
Stochastic dominance implies the following bounds for the ATE on the compliers:
UB




 Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1)    Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0)

: (14)
The intuition is that any mean potential outcome of the compliers is at best as high as that of the
always selected, such that  Y1;1 and  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0 01)=P1j0) are upper bounds for E[Y (1)jG =
2010] and E[Y (0)jG = 10], respectively. Thus, the bounds are likely to be tighter than the worst case
bounds since  Y1;1   Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1) and  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0)  Y UB.
In particular, stochastic dominance bears considerable identifying power for the lower bound
of the eect, since it does not depend on Y UB anymore. This is a relevant result for empirical
applications, where the lower bound is often more interesting than the upper bound, as it provides
evidence on the existence of a positive eect. Note that since  Y1;1(minj(P1j1 P1j0+01)=P1j1) is
minimized for 01 = min
01 and  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0) is maximized for 01 = max
01 , we need
to minimize LB
10 over all possible values of 01.








01 = Y LB    Y0;1: (15)
As for the compliers, any mean potential outcome of the deers can be at best as high as
the one of the always selected such that  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) constitutes the upper
bound under treatment and  Y0;1 the upper bound under non-treatment. These bounds are
likely to be narrower than the worst case bounds since  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)  Y UB and
 Y0;1   Y0;1(maxj01=P1j0). Since  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) is maximized for 01 = max
01 and
 Y0;1(minj01=P1j0) is minimized for 01 = min
01 , we need to maximize UB
01 over all possible
values of 01.





  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   max
01 )=P1j1)  







  Y1;1  






P1j1 + P1j0   max
01
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y1;1  
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0









 Y LB: (16)
21For both the upper and the lower bound of S=1, stochastic dominance eliminates either Y UB
or Y LB present in the worst case scenario. Intuitively, the identication region must shrink since
the bounds for always selected, compliers, and deers become narrower. E.g., in the case that





 ( Y1;1   Y LB) +
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0





  Y1;1 +
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
 (Y LB    Y0;1   Y UB): (17)
Interestingly, these bounds are are tighter than the ones on 11. Once again, we obtain more
informative bounds for the selected population than for the always selected if 00 > 11.
3.4 Monotonicity and stochastic dominance
In the subsequent discussion, we investigate the identifying power of a combination of Assump-
tions 3 and 4. This was rst considered by Zhang and Rubin (2003) who derive the following
bounds for the ATE on the always selected which are shown to be sharp by Imai (2008):
UB
11 =  Y1;1(maxjP1j0=P1j1)    Y0;1;
LB
11 =  Y1;1    Y0;1: (18)
These bounds are a simplication of those under stochastic dominance for the special case that
01 = 0. The upper bound is the same as under monotonicity and is, thus, not aected by
additionally assuming stochastic dominance. The latter has no further impact on the conditional
means to be compared. However, the lower bound is tightened by the fact that  Y1;1 now constitutes
the lower bound of the mean potential outcome of the always selected under treatment.
22In the same manner, the bounds on the compliers simplify to
UB
10 =  Y1;1   Y LB;
LB
10 =  Y1;1(minj1   P1j0=P1j1)    Y0;1: (19)
The upper bound is the same as under stochastic dominance and is not aected by adding
monotonicity. The reason is that ruling out deers does not change the comparison outcome
under non-treatment, which is still the theoretical lower bound (as compliers are not observed
under non-treatment). Also for the lower bound, monotonicity does not bring any benets for
the same reasons as under Assumption 3: For all admissible values 01  0, 01 = 0 minimizes
the lower bound of the mean potential outcome under treatment. Therefore, setting 01 = 0 by
assumption does neither increase the lower bound of the mean potential outcome, nor of 10.




















 ( Y1;1    Y0;1) +
P1j1   P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
 ( Y1;1    Y0;1)
=  Y1;1    Y0;1: (20)
Compared to just invoking monotonicity, the upper bound of S=1 is unaected by the intro-
duction of stochastic dominance. This is due to the fact that  Y1;1 still represents the weighted
average of the mean potential outcomes under treatment of the always selected and the compliers
(even if the potential outcomes are now restricted in a particular way by stochastic dominance).
Nor does the assumption change the bound of any other potential outcome relevant to the upper
bound. Stochastic dominance does, however, change the lower bound on S=1.  Y0;1 now rep-
resents the mean potential outcome under non-treatment for all selected individuals because it
constitutes the upper bound on the compliers' mean potential outcome. Therefore, an interesting
23result of imposing both assumptions is that the lower bound now coincides with the one for the
always selected.
3.5 Monotone treatment response
As the last identifying assumption considered, we briey discuss the so called \monotone treat-
ment response" assumption suggested by Manski (1997):
Assumption 5:
Pr(Y (1)  Y (0)) = 1 (montone treatment response):
Assumption 5 restricts the eect of the treatment to be non-negative implying that the lower
bound under any other assumptions discussed so far may not be smaller than zero. Apart from
Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006), who use this assumption together with Assumption 3
to bound the ATE of private school vouchers, monotone treatment response has received little
attention in the literature on partial identication under sample selection.3 This may be due to
the limited attractiveness of a priori restricting the direction of the eect when the latter is un-
known to the researcher. We will, therefore, not invoke Assumption 5 in the application discussed
further below.
4 Estimation
While the focus of our paper lies on identication, this section briey sketches estimation, which
is based on the sample analogs of the bounds derived under the various assumptions. To this
3However, it has been very inuential elsewhere, see for instance Gern and Schellhorn (2006), Gonz alez (2005),
and Kreider and Hill (2009) for empirical applications in health and labor economics. Furthermore, Blanco, Flores,
and Flores-Lagunes (2011) consider a somewhat related assumption which restricts the ATE on the always selected
to be non-negative.
24end, we dene the following sample parameters:
^ P1j1 
Pn
i=1 Si  Ti Pn
i=1 Ti
; ^ P0j1  1  
Pn





i=1 Si  (1   Ti)
Pn
i=1(1   Ti)
; ^ P0j0  1  
Pn




^  Y1;1 
Pn
i=1 Yi  Si  Ti Pn
i=1 Si  Ti
; ^  Y0;1 
Pn
i=1 Yi  Si  (1   Ti)
Pn
i=1 Si  (1   Ti)
;
^  Yt;s(maxjq) 
Pn
i=1 Yi  IfSi = sg  IfTi = tg  IfY  ^ y1 qg
Pn
i=1 IfSi = sg  IfTi = tg  IfY  ^ y1 qg
;
^  Yt;s(minjq) 
Pn
i=1 Yi  IfSi = sg  IfTi = tg  IfY  ^ yqg
Pn
i=1 IfSi = sg  IfTi = tg  IfY  ^ yqg
;




i=1 Si  Ti  IfYi  yg
Pn




where Ifg is the indicator function. Using these expressions instead of the population parame-
ters in the formulas for the bounds immediately yields feasible estimators. However, note that
depending on the parameters considered, particular common support conditions have to be sat-
ised. E.g., the estimation of ^ P1j1; ^ P0j1 and ^ P1j0; ^ P0j0 requires that Pr(T = 1) > 0 and Pr(T =
1) < 1, respectively (or that 0 < Pr(T = 1) < 1 for the joint estimation of ^ P1j1; ^ P0j1; ^ P1j0; ^ P0j0).
Likewise, ^  Y1;1 demands that E(S  D) > 0 and ^  Y0;1 that E(S  D) < 1.
p
n-consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimators of the bounds for the compliers
and the selected population under both monotonicity and stochastic dominance directly follows





11 = ^  Y1;1(maxj ^ P1j0= ^ P1j1)   ^  Y0;1;
^ LB
11 = ^  Y1;1(minj ^ P1j0= ^ P1j1)   ^  Y0;1:
In the appendix, Lee (2009) shows
p
n-consistency and asymptotic normality using a GMM
framework based on Theorems 2.6 and 7.2 of Newey and McFadden (1994). As argued therein,
it is obvious that it suces to show the desirable properties for ^  Y1;1(maxj ^ P1j0= ^ P1j1) and
25^  Y1;1(maxj ^ P1j0= ^ P1j1) (or just one of them due to the symmetry of the problem) because these
estimators are independent of the observed mean outcome under non-treatment ^  Y0;1.
Now consider the estimators for the compliers under monotonicity:
^ UB
10 = ^  Y1;1(maxj1   P1j0=P1j1)   Y LB;
^ LB
10 = ^  Y1;1(minj1   P1j0=P1j1)   Y UB: (21)
Y LB;Y UB are constants not relevant for the properties of the estimators. Furthermore, note
that the problem of estimating ^  Y1;1(maxj1   P1j0=P1j1) is symmetric to ^  Y1;1(maxj ^ P1j0= ^ P1j1)
(and ^  Y1;1(minj1 P1j0=P1j1) to ^  Y1;1(maxj ^ P1j0= ^ P1j1)). Therefore, Lee's results immediately apply
to the estimators of the bounds for the compliers. This in turn implies
p
n-consistency and
asymptotic normality of ^ UB
S=1; ^ LB
S=1, as the selected population is just a weighted average of
the always selected and compliers. Finally, note that imposing stochastic dominance in addition
to monotonicity replaces some parameters in the estimators by simple conditional means, which
again entails
p
n-consistency and asymptotic normality of all estimators.
5 Application
In this section, we use our methods to re-evaluate the school voucher experiment of Angrist,
Bettinger, and Kremer (2006). As mentioned before, the authors investigate the eects of school
vouchers provided to high school students in the course of Colombia's PACES program (taking
place between 1991 and 1997). The outcome we focus on are the reading scores achieved in the
centralized college entrance examinations, the ICFES, several years later. Many of the vouchers
that covered half the cost of private secondary schooling were randomly assigned by a lottery
among applicants such that Assumption 2 appears likely to hold. The experimental estimates
in Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) suggest that vouchers increase reading test scores on
average by roughly 0.7 points (or roughly 0.12 standard deviations) and this result is signicant
at the 5% level.
26However, only 30.2% (or 1223 students) of the 4044 applicants actually took the test. There-
fore, the experimental estimates might be awed by selection bias. E.g., if the treatment posi-
tively aects the likelihood to take the test such that also a priori less motivated students are
induced to participate, then the distribution of motivation diers across treated and non-treated
students conditional on being tested. If motivation positively aects the test scores, this entails a
(downward) bias of the estimated eect. For this reason, Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006)
use both censored regression to control for sample selection and derive nonparametric bounds
on the ATE of the always selected population based on Assumptions 3 (monotonicity of selec-
tion) and 5 (monotone treatment response). On balance, they still nd substantial gains from
the PACES program.
We complement their analysis by estimating the ATE under dierent sets of assumptions and
for several populations. To be specic, we invoke Assumption 3 (monotonicity of selection) and/or
Assumption 4 (stochastic dominance) to bound the ATE on the always selected, compliers, and
the selected population. Both assumptions appear to be plausible in this context. Monotonicity
roots in the presumption that the treatment weakly increases participation in the exam because
private schools are plausibly more committed to the academic success of their (paying) students,
which may serve as measure of school quality. Stochastic dominance seems reasonable because
the always selected are those taking the exam irrespective of the treatment and are, thus, likely
to have higher potential test scores than other groups, for instance due to ability or motivation.
We do not consider Assumption 5 (monotone treatment response) which restricts the direction
of the eects.
Estimation is based on the approach outlined in the last section. Concerning inference, we
compute the condence intervals based on the method described in Imbens and Manski (2004),
which contains the treatment eect of interest with a probability of at least 95%:

^ LB   1:645  ^ LB; ^ UB + 1:645  ^ UB

;
27where ^ LB; ^ UB are the estimated bounds and ^ LB; ^ UB denote their respective estimated stan-
dard errors. We compute the latter by bootstrapping the original sample 1999 times and esti-
mating ^ LB; ^ UB in each bootstrap replication in order to estimate their distributions. As worst
case bounds Y UB and Y LB, we take the maximum and minimum test scores observed among test
takers.
The estimates of the conditional selection probabilities, ^ P1j1 = 0:328, ^ P1j0 = 0:267, ^ P0j1 =
0:672, and ^ P0j0 = 0:733, allow us to bound the strata proportions. Table 4 reports these bounds
and shows that the lower bound on the share of the never selected is larger than the upper
bound on the share of any other population and in particular than the one of the always selected.
Therefore, without monotonicity the bounds on this population will be uninformative in the
worst case scenario and quite large under stochastic dominance. Moreover, the lower bound of
the compliers' share is larger than zero such that positive monotonicity is consistent with the
data whereas negative is not. In Table 4 we also provide the estimated strata proportions and
the mixture probabilities under Assumption 3 (monotonicity), which are then point identied.
Table 4: Estimated (bounds on the) proportions of latent strata
Latent strata Bounds without monotonicity Proportions under monotonicity
Always selected [0.000, 0.267] 0.267
Compliers [0.061, 0.328] 0.061
Never selected [0.406, 0.672] 0.672
Deers [0.000, 0.267] -
Always selected among selected 0.897
Compliers among selected 0.103
Table 5 presents the results for the always selected, compliers, and the selected population
under various assumptions. The bounds of the ATE estimates are given in square brackets, the
95% condence intervals in round brackets. The worst case bounds are not informative for the al-
ways selected and very wide for any other population. Invoking monotonicity narrows the bounds
substantially for the always selected and the selected population, even though the identication
region still includes a zero eect. As discussed before, monotonicity has no identifying power for
the compliers as a zero proportion of 01 implies the widest bounds possible.
28The stochastic dominance assumption entails narrower bounds than the worst case scenario for
all three populations. However, for the always selected, the identication region is substantially
larger than under monotonicity. Using both assumptions jointly brings important improvements.
The lower bounds of the ATEs on the always selected and the selected population are now
signicantly larger than zero and point to a positive eect of private schooling. Also the upper
bounds do not appear unreasonably high. For the selected population, this is due to the small
share of compliers (10.28%) to which the theoretical upper bound Y UB applies. For the compliers
alone, the bounds are not more informative than under stochastic dominance, as monotonicity
does not further narrow the bounds for reasons discussed in Section 3.
Table 5: ATE estimates and condence intervals
Assumptions Always selected Compliers Selected
Worst case bounds [-31.000, 32.000] [-24.083, 24.799] [-16.632, 17.368]
Not informative (-25.658, 26.106) (-16.891, 17.628)
Monotonicity [-0.942, 2.218] [-24.083, 24.799] [-1.805, 3.115]
(-1.731, 2.978) (-25.658, 26.106) ( -2.824, 4.122)
Stochastic dominance [ -13.396, 17.079] [ -13.439, 17.604] [-8.706, 17.368]
( -14.666, 18.755) ( -14.566, 20.852) (-9.403, 18.068)
Mon. + stoch. dom. [0.683, 2.218] [-7.004, 17.604] [0.683, 3.115]
(0.152, 2.978) (-8.626, 17.932) (0.152, 4.122)
Note: Bounds in square brackets and condence intervals in round brackets.
Condence intervals are based on 1999 bootstraps.
All in all our results give support to the conclusions of Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006)
suggesting that the PACES program in Colombia had a positive eect on the reading scores in
college entrance examinations. The lower bounds of the ATEs on those who would take the
test irrespective of private schooling (supposedly the most able and motivated) and on all test
takers are positive when invoking both monotonicity and stochastic dominance. Furthermore, the
Imbens and Manski (2004) condence intervals suggest that these ATEs are signicantly dierent
from zero. For the compliers alone, however, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero eect
based on our assumptions.
296 Conclusion
This paper discusses the partial identication of average treatment eects (ATE) in the presence
of sample selection, implying that outcomes are only observed for a non-random subpopulation.
The previous work considering this problem has predominantly focussed on bounding the ATE
on the \always selected", whose outcomes are observed irrespective of the treatment received.
Here, we also derived sharp bounds for other populations such as the \compliers" (selected under
treatment, not selected under non-treatment) and the selected population (all individuals whose
outcomes are observed), which is a mixture of several groups.
These populations appear to be relevant for policy recommendations in many empirical con-
texts. Taking, for instance, the compliers, one might be interested whether switching the selec-
tion state as a reaction on the treatment comes along with (and may be rooted in) a particular
treatment eect. An example is the eect of a training on wages, which might induce formerly
unemployed individuals to work because their potential wage surpasses their reservation wage af-
ter the training. Furthermore, it might be preferable to make causal statements rather for larger
than for smaller shares of the total population. The largest subgroup for which outcomes are
observed is the selected population, such that results obtained for these individuals are likely to
have more external validity than those based on smaller (and unobservable) subgroups.
In the discussion on identication, we have argued that the combination of monotonicity (of
selection in the treatment) and stochastic dominance (of the potential outcomes of the always
selected over those of others) assumptions may bear considerable identifying power even for
populations whose outcomes are, in contrast to the always selected, only observed in one treatment
state. In particular, it has been shown that the lower bound of the ATE on the selected population
coincides with the lower bound for the always selected. This is an important result, as we are
often most interested in the lower bound, which gives evidence about the existence of a positive
eect. Its practical relevance has been demonstrated by means of an empirical application to a
school voucher experiment.
30Finally, the paper also shows that principal stratication provides an adequate framework for
a better understanding of the identifying assumptions involved, because they are expressed in
terms of individual selection behavior rather than the less tangible relation of error terms in some
structural model. For example, we have found that if the share of the always selected is smaller
than the one of never selected, bounds on the always selected are not informative if we do not
assume monotonicity of selection in the treatment. In contrast, we can still bound the ATE on
the selected population. This might be hard to see from the equations characterizing a structural
model.
31A Appendix
A.1 Worst case scenario
A.1.1 Proof of the sharpness of the simplied bounds on 11










[ Y1;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)    Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0)]: (A.2)
Imai (2008) shows that these bounds are sharp, but they can be simplied such that optimization is not required:
 Y1;1(maxj(P1j0 01)=P1j1)  E(Y jT = 1;S = 1;y  F
 1




P1j1 , is maximized. Since
P1j1 P1j0+01
P1j1 is increasing in 01, it is maximized when 01 = 
max
01 . Similarly
 Y0;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j0) is minimized when
P1j0 01
P1j0 , which is decreasing in 01, is minimized, namely when
01 = 
max
01 . Noticing that
P1j0 01




P1j0 are decreasing and increasing functions of 01,
respectively, ends the proof.
A.1.2 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds on 10
Lemma 1 together with Proposition 1 in Imai (2008) shows that  Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1) and
 Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1) are the sharp upper and lower bounds of E(Y jT = 1;G = 10). Since the
sampling process does not impose any restrictions on the distribution of Y given T = 0 and G = 10 for a xed
value of 01, the bounds are sharp. Finally, since 01 is unknown, the bounds are obtained by maximizing




P1j1 are decreasing and increasing in 01,respectively, 
min
01 is the optimal choice in both cases.
A.1.3 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds on 01
Lemma 1 together with Proposition 1 in Imai (2008) shows that  Y0;1(maxj01=P1j0) and  Y0;1(minj01=P1j0) are the
sharp upper and lower bounds of E(Y jT = 0;G = 01). Since the sampling process does not impose any restriction
on the distribution of Y given T = 1 and G = 01 for a xed value of 01, the bounds are sharp. Finally, since
01 is unknown, the bounds are obtained by maximizing (minimizing) the upper (the lower) bound w.r.t. to its




P1j0 are decreasing and increasing in 01, respectively, 
min
01 is the
optimal choice in both cases.
32A.1.4 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds on S=1
We will show the sharpness of the upper bound, the proof for the lower bound is analogous. First of all, notice
that if w is a random variable which is distributed as a two components mixture
f(w) = p  f(w1) + (1   p)  f(w2) p 2 [0;1];
then
E(w) = p  E(wjw  F
 1
w (1   p)) + (1   p)  E(wjw  F
 1
w (1   p)); (A.3)
where E(wjw  F
 1
w (1   p)) is the upper bound of E(w1) and E(wjw  F
 1
w (1   p)) is the lower bound of E(w2).




  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) +
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
P1j1





  Y1;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) +
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
P1j1





  Y0;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j0) +
01
P1j0





  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0) +
01
P1j0
  Y0;1(minj01=P1j0): (A.7)
Moreover, notice that
S=1 =
2  (P1j0   01)
P1j1 + P1j0
 11 +






For the upper bound, substituting 11 by 
UB
11 , 10 by 
UB
10 and 01 by 
UB
01 in (A.8) would give a sharp upper
bound on S=1. However, such a bound would contradict (A.3) since it is impossible to have the upper bounds
for the always selected and the compliers and the lower bounds for the always selected and the deers at the same




2  (P1j0   01)
P1j1 + P1j0
 ( Y1;1(min or maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)    Y0;1(min or maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0))
+
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
P1j1 + P1j0






UB    Y0;1(min or maxj01=P1j0)): (A.9)
From (A.4),(A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) we have, respectively,
 Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1) =
P1j1
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  Y1;1  
P1j0   01
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) (A.10)
 Y1;1(maxj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1) =
P1j1
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  Y1;1  
P1j0   01
P1j1   P1j0 + 01




  Y0;1  
P1j0   01
01




  Y0;1  
P1j0   01
01
  Y0;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j0) (A.13)










  Y1;1  











This is maximized for  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0 01)=P1j1)  Y0;1(minj(P1j0 01)=P1j0). For a given value of 01 this bound is
sharp. Finally, we again need to maximize w.r.t. 01. However, we will show that 
UB
S=1 is maximized for 01 = 
max
01 .
Indeed, by taking its derivative w.r.t. 01, dening  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0 01)=P1j1)   Y0;1(minj(P1j0 01)=P1j0)  Y ,
and performing some simple algebra one obtains
Y
UB   Y






+ Y : (A.14)
which is always satised, because Y
UB   Y
LB is generally larger than Y and P1j0  01. (A.14) holds as an
equality only if 01 = P1j0 = 
max
01 . This ends the proof.
34A.2 Monotonicity
Any bounds derived under monotonicity are special cases of the worst case bounds given 01 = 0 and, therefore,
they are sharp.
A.3 Stochastic dominance
First of all, we will prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1: If w is a random variable which is distributed as a two components mixture
f(w) = p  f(w1) + (1   p)  f(w2) p 2 [0;1];
and F(w1  t)  F(w2  t) 8t 2 ( 1;+1), and if g() is a function that respect stochastic dominance, the
following bounds are sharp:







 if t < F
 1
w ();
1 if t  F
 1
w ();
U = F(w  t):
Proof: The lower bound is sharp because of Lemma 1 in Imai (2008). Similar to Lemma 2 in Imai (2008), the
identication region of F(w1  t) is 	w1 
n
F(wt) (1 1) w2
1 :  w2  F(w  t)
o
such that U  F(w  t)   w1
stochastically dominates any admissible value of the identication region of F(w1  t). This proves the sharpness
of the upper bound.
A.3.1 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds on 10
Lemma 1 shows that  Y1;1 and  Y1;1(minj(P1j1 P1j0+01)=P1j1) are the sharp upper and lower bounds on E(Y jT =
1;G = 10). Under Assumption 4 the lower bound of E(Y jT = 0;G = 10) remains Y
LB. On the other hand, the
upper bound cannot be larger than  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0  01)=P1j0). This implies that the upper bound is sharp while
the lower bound is sharp for any xed value of 01. The sharp lower bound is obtained minimizing over all possible
values of 01.
35A.3.2 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds on 01
Lemma 1 shows that  Y0;1 and  Y0;1(minj
min
01 =P1j0) are the sharp upper and lower bounds for E(Y jT = 0;G = 01).
Under Assumption 4 the lower bound of E(Y jT = 1;G = 01) remains Y
LB. On the other hand, the upper bound
cannot be larger than  Y1;1(minj(P1j0   01)=P1j1). This implies that the lower bound is sharp while the upper
bound is sharp for any xed value of 01. The sharp upper bound is obtained maximizing over all possible values
of 01.
A.3.3 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds on S=1
We only prove the sharpness of the upper bound, the proof for the lower bound is analogous. The sharp upper
bound would be obtained substituting 11 with 
UB
11 , 10 with 
UB
10 and 01 with 
UB
01 in (16). Again, such a
bound would contradict (A.3).
Therefore, we have four admissible solutions:
1. 
UB
11 ,  Y1;1(minj(P1j1   P1j0 + 01)=P1j1)   Y






  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)  






  Y1;1  




2.  Y1;1    Y0;1, 
UB






  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)  




P1j1 + P1j0   01
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y1;1  

























  Y1;1  





















  Y0;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j0) +












S=1 is the sharp upper bound it is sucient to show that
P1j0
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) +
P1j1
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y1;1 
01
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1) +




2  P1j0   01
P1j1 + P1j0
  Y0;1 
P1j0   01
P1j1 + P1j0




Simple algebra shows that the two inequalities are always satised. In order to show that we do not need to
maximize 
UB
S=1 over all possible values of 01, it is sucient to see that its rst derivative w.r.t. 01, given by
 Y0;1   Y
LB + P1j0 
@  Y1;1(maxj(P1j0   01)=P1j1)
@01
is always positive, since  Y0;1   Y
LB > 0 and P1j0 
@  Y1;1(max j(P1j0 01)=P1j1)
@01 > 0. Therefore 
UB




A.4 Monotonicity and stochastic dominance
All bounds derived under monotonicity and stochastic dominance are special cases of the bounds derived under
stochastic dominance alone given that 01 = 0. Therefore, the bounds are sharp.
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